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ABSTRACT: Our networked society increasingly needs secure identity systems. .e Attribute-based 
credentials (ABC) technology is designed to be privacy-friendlier than contemporary authentication 
methods, which often su/er from information overspill. So far, however, some of the wider implica-
tions of ABC have not been appropriately discussed, mainly because they lie outside of the research 
scope of most cryptographers and computer engineers. .is paper explores a range of such implica-
tions, shows that there are potential risks associated with the wider introduction of ABC in society, 
and makes the case that legal and societal aspects of ABC be subjected to extended interdisciplinary 
research. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Technology mediates today’s data-driven society in which the demands for secure 
and privacy-friendly digital identity management is growing. Scientist, industry and 
policy makers have –at least in the past– approached the privacy and security aspects 
of identity management as being a trade-o/ between the two. Cryptographic solutions, 
like attribute-based credentials (ABC), however, enable to build more secure and yet 
privacy-friendly identity management systems. National governments in the EU are 
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allocating funds to implement identity management systems and ABC make an in-
teresting candidate. So far, however, there has been little discussion about the wider 
implications of ABC because they fall outside the normal research 0eld of cryptogra-
phers and computer engineers. It has to be admitted that, despite good intentions, ABC 
implementations nevertheless still introduce a range of societal issues with regard to 
privacy and identity. .erefore, extended interdisciplinary research on the societal and 
legal e/ects of ABC is gaining in relevance. 
.is paper gives a technical and architectural overview of the ABC concept. 
It will continue with an exploration of the reciprocal relationship between the self, 
identity construction, technology and the architectural decisions within an ABC ecosys-
tem. Furthermore, the paper deals with questions regarding the extent to which an ABC 
system meets the legal concept of Data Protection by Design and Data Protection by 
Default.
2. AN OVERVIEW OF ATTRIBUTEBASED CREDENTIALS
In most computer-related scienti0c work a digital identity is considered to be a set 
of characteristics describing certain properties about an individual. .is set is dynamic, 
and depends on the context in which the individual is known. .e attribute-based cre-
dential technology (Camenisch et al., 2011, Sabouri et al., 2012, Alpár & Jacobs, 2013) 
implements this model. Personal characteristics, such as age, name, social security num-
ber, credit card number as well as more mundane data, like hair colour and favourite 
dish, are called attributes in this model. Some of these attributes are not directly identi-
fying (e.g. age or hair colour) whereas others are (e.g. name or social security number). 1 
In the conventional identity management model, identity providers are involved in 
retrieving authentic attributes. After user authentication, the identity provider retrieves 
and sends personal information about the user to the service provider. .is process de-
mands user identi0cation and includes a trusted third party. For example: An individual 
can use her Facebook account to sign in to a Spotify account.
2.1. "e ABC Characteristics
.e ABC model stores attributes in a secure container called an attribute-based 
credential. .is credential contains a predetermined set of attributes, whose values are 
determined by the characteristics of the individual user.
1 .e identifying value of certain attributes led to the preference of ABC over the older term 
anonymous credentials.
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Attribute values are reliably veri0ed by an issuer o make sure they match the 
individual’s characteristics. .e issuer then secures the attributes in a credential by a 
digital signature. A municipality, for example, can issue a credential for the attributes 
of place of birth, residence, date of birth and certain age categories. Once some creden-
tials are issued, the user can disclose a subset of her attributes to a service provider who 
requires certain information before providing a service. An online video rental store, 
for example, may need to verify that an individual is over 18 years old before allowing 
access to an age-restricted movie. Revealing this age category attribute ‘I’m older than 
18’ is done via the mechanism called selective disclosure.
A typical selective disclosure process runs as follows: An individual user selects a servi-
ce to access. .e service provider sends a presentation policy (e.g, Camenisch et al., 2013) 
to the user asking her to reveal the value for a selection of attributes contained in one or 
more of her credentials. In order to protect against service providers sending overly broad 
presentation policies that ask for a non-proportionate selection of attributes, the policies 
are signed by a scheme authority prior to the selective disclosure process. Service providers 
can apply for the signature on a certain presentation policy at the scheme authority. .ey 
receive this signature after proving the relevance and proportionality of the set of requested 
attributes. During the selective disclosure process the user veri0es this signature before 
accepting the presentation policy. .e user subsequently decides whether she agrees to 
reveal all the requested attributes. In order to trust the values received, the service provider 
expects the credentials to be issued by known and trusted issuers. Sometimes, the system 
allows the user to choose to reveal only a subset of requested attributes. If the user refuses 
to reveal attributes, the service provider may choose to refuse the user’s request, or o/er 
only limited functionality.2 Once all checks are done the attributes are revealed. Depen-
ding on the disclosed attribute values, the service provider can make an access decision.
2.2. "e ABC Principles
From a technical point of view ABC must satisfy three requirements: unlinkabi-
lity, con0dentiality and security. .e selective disclosure protocol uses zero-knowledge 
proofs as underlying privacy-enhancing technology (PET). Such zero-knowledge proofs 
allow a user to convince the service provider about the fact that she owns a credential, 
signed by the issuer, containing the attribute values disclosed, without showing the full 
credential itself to the service provider. .e proofs achieve unlinkability: Given two 
proofs of ownership of a particular credential type, it should be impossible to determine 
(using the proofs alone) whether the same individual produced them or not. Clearly, 
this is trivial if an identifying attribute is revealed in the selective disclosure. Establishing 
a secure, encrypted, channel between the user and the service provider typically ensures 
2 .is is similar to what happens when users refuse to accept cookies or block website scripts.
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con0dentiality: Only the service provider learns the values of the attributes the user 
chooses to reveal, and she learns nothing more. For security purposes only the owner of 
a credential must be able to prove ownership of this credential. Even if several indivi-
dual requests collude, a user should not be able to convince the verifier that she owns a 
credential that she originally do not possess. .is is partially guaranteed by the fact that 
issuers sign credentials. .is prevents rogue parties to create fake credentials. However, 
to prevent users to pool or share attributes in credentials, additional mechanisms are 
necessary. To this end, it is, 0rst of all, assumed that each user has a private key, to which 
even the user is not privy. Secondly, credentials typically contain an expiry date. To im-
prove the security, some ABC systems store the credentials on a smart card, and let the 
smart card compute the necessary zero-knowledge proofs.3
2.3. "e ABC Use Cases
Attribute-based credential systems, especially when implemented on smart cards, 
can be used both o2ine and online. An example of an o2ine use case is the use of a to-
bacco vending machine. To prevent the sale of tobacco to minors, the vending machine 
can use ABC technology to verify that the buyer is over 18 (or whatever the appropriate 
legal limit is). For this to work, users must be able to obtain a credential from the mu-
nicipality that contains an «over 18» attribute. When buying cigarettes the user inserts 
her smart card in the vending machine and proves she is over eighteen and from there 
on continues the purchase transaction. 
A typical example of an online use case for ABC is verifying whether a user is subs-
cribed to an online service (such as a digital newspaper or Net3ix). .ese service provi-
ders demand strong guarantees that only paying costumers can access the content. With 
the ABC technology the service provider can issue a credential with an attribute of the 
type of subscription for every new subscriber. .is attribute does not need to contain 
a membership number (thus, not identifying); access to content can be decided on the 
type of subscription after the zero-knowledge proof. In this example the service provider 
is both a credential issuer as well as a relying party towards the attribute.
2.4. "e ABC Ecosystems
Scheme authorities play an important role in attribute-based credential schemes. 
.ey are responsible for keeping the scheme trustworthy to all stakeholders. Trust is 
maintained by having a clear policy, describing the roles and responsibilities of all parti-
cipants in the scheme, and by e/ectively enforcing this policy. .e scheme authority has 
the power to do so because it can decide
3 For example, the IRMA project (https://www.irmacard.org).
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• which issuers are members of the scheme, 
• which credentials/attributes a particular issuer can issue,
• which service providers are members of the scheme,
• which credentials/attributes a particular service provider is allowed to access, and,
• which users are issued a card.
.ese 0ve powers are enforced by the ABC technology. .e party that functions as 
the scheme authority, and the policy that it de0nes has a major in3uence on the trust 
and functionality of the corresponding ABC system. We call a particular instance of an 
ABC scheme with a certain policy an ecosystem. Several ecosystems can coexist
One possible ecosystem is a national eID system where a government agency is a 
scheme authority, and whose policy restricts the use of such an eID to government only 
issuers and service providers. Such a top-down ecosystem has a restricted functionality, 
but most likely a high level of trust among the service providers while perhaps having a 
lower level of trust (in terms of privacy) among particular group of users.
A more 3exible ecosystem is created by also allowing private sector use of such a 
government issued eID card. Companies can then serve as issuers and service providers. 
.is hugely increases the number of possible applications of the eID card, but perhaps 
lowers the overall trust in the system.
Bottom-up, private sector based, approaches are also possible. For example, di/e-
rent companies can decide to issue ABC cards that conform to a certain industry stan-
dard that allow arbitrary issuers and service providers to use the platform. In essence in 
such a setup, no scheme authority is present at all. But small groups of stakeholders may 
decide to create a scheme authority of their own and use the open platform to create a 
more closed ABC subsystem. Multiple ABC schemes then coexist on a single card.
3. THE SOCIOTECHNICAL ASPECTS OF ABC’S
.e following section will assess the socio-technical aspects of the techniques dis-
cussed above. In today’s society authentication is of great importance. Often legal or se-
curity rules require individuals to prove certain attributes. Take, for instance, the exam-
ple of buying tobacco in the previous section. Without an ABC system an individual 
has to show an ID card to prove the «over 18» attribute, yet these IDs show additional, 
non-necessary attributes, like date of birth, name, place of birth, gender, etc. Showing 
additional, non-necessary attributes can be considered an information overspill and gi-
ves rise to privacy concerns.
Privacy plays a crucial role for the autonomy of individuals with regard to their 
identity management (cf. Go/man, 1959). Often, privacy is described in terms of con-
trol over personal information. .e legal scholar Westin de0nes privacy as «[...] the 
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claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, 
and to what extent information about them is communicated to others» (Westin, 1966, 
p. 7). .e information scientist Agre de0nes the right to privacy as «the freedom from 
unreasonable constraints on the construction of one’s own identity» (Agre, 1998, p. 7). 
A lack of privacy can deprive individuals of choices concerning their self-presentations 
and the types of social relationships they can establish (Rössler, 2001, p. 112). Privacy 
breaches can therefore restrict an ndividual in her autonomy to develop her own identi-
ty and determine her life plan (Kupfer, 1987, p. 82). 
ABC can limit the information overspill. By, for example, only revealing to be over 
18 instead of revealing all information on an ID card, ABC systems give technologically 
dictated privacy safeguards. .e selective disclosure of attributes can be an e/ective 
means to battle discrimination and aid individuals to control their information.4 To a 
certain extent an ABC system improves the autonomy with regard to revealing personal 
information in di/erent contexts. 
Despite these promising facts, ABC form a technology and as such it actively co-
shapes the environment in which it is deployed as well as the way individuals relate to 
one another (cf. Verbeek, 2005). In this capacity ABC systems are interesting to extensi-
vely re3ect on from a non-technical view. An ABC card is not just an artefact; one can-
not simply «use» it. .e technology of the ABC card is «a sociotechnical system of use», 
«a system using combinations of hardware and people (and usually other elements) to 
accomplish tasks that humans cannot perform unaided by such systems» (Kline, 1985, 
p. 210-211). .e ABC technology is an artefact that reveals whether an individual has 
or does not have a certain attribute, this is something that without the aid of any arte-
facts (including ID cards) people are not able to accurately perceive for a majority of at-
tributes. .e e/ects of a new technology cannot be easily predicted until the technology 
is extensively deployed (Collingridge, 1980). However, due to the potential of ABC in a 
(future EU obligatory) eID system, we do want to anticipate on the possible impact of 
ABC on one’s autonomy. We will focus on ABC implementations on smart cards. 
3.1. Attributes: the ‘Haves’ and ‘Have Nots’
Labelling individuals with certain attributes and others not, could have bene0ts 
for both individuals and society in several contexts.5 .e ABC technology provides for 
an easy means to do so. However ABC technology may not only provide others with 
4 E.g. persons who are questioning or experimenting with their gender may not want to share 
their current legal genderstatus, which may di/er from their social identity.
5 See for instance Liagkou, et al. (2014). As the title suggests, this paper is a summary of ABC-
4Trust’s Greek pilot’s setup (results are not included yet). . is paper includes a general discus-
sion about the dangers of ABC applications in public opinion polls without thorough analysis 
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information (individual A has or does not have attribute B) – but it also ‘shapes’ the 
information and the manner in which it is experienced. .roughout history people 
use technology to view the world in a fashion to which they are not capable to do so 
without the mediation of technology, and in return technology may co-shape the man-
ner in which individuals perceive and interpret themselves and their world (Ihde, 1983, 
p.22). For instance the use of a thermometer: people cannot feel ‘degrees’ as such and 
can only perceive it with the use of this artefact. In return the technology mediates our 
self-interpretation and interpretation of others. Some people use the thermometer as a 
decisive factor to regard oneself as ill or verging on ill.  
Since the ABC technology sees on identity management, it is important to raise the 
question how an ABC system would a/ect the manner in which individuals interpret 
their identity and that of others. Will this privacy-enhancing technology (PET) lead to 
a culture in which the individual becomes a ‘have’ or a ‘have not’ of certain attributes? 
ABC systems could potentially be a foundation for the use of overformalized personae 
because the individual gets access to certain services based on a black-and-white scena-
rio: either one has the attribute or one does not have the attribute. .is scenario ignores 
the –often spacious– gray area between these two extremes, in which many factors play 
a role in self-interpretation. .e types and value options of attributes are therefore of 
the utmost importance. For instance, with regard to gender Australia recognizes gen-
der X. When an ABC ecosystem only recognizes the attribute values ‘female’ or ‘male’, 
individuals with gender X are limited in their identity-construction in the ABC ecosys-
tem and will be forced to ‘0t’ into the options o/ered by the ecosystem. For attribute 
types and values individuals will be highly dependent on the discretion of the scheme 
manager and issuers. .us, the discretionary power of scheme managers and issuers 
has a far-reaching in3uence on the autonomy of individuals to shape their identity. An 
individual cannot ‘be’ what is not recognised as an attribute in the ecosystem. In return, 
the attributes allocated to a speci0c individual can have a re3exive e/ect with regard to 
that individual’s self-interpretation. For an individual it generally is important to be 
recognized by others in correspondence with her self-identity. .e sociologist Giddens 
points out that self-identity «has to be routinely created and sustained in the re3exive 
activities of the individual» (Giddens, 1991, p. 52). .is re3exive self-interpretation 
could be in3uenced by the allocation of attributes and the continuous con0rmation of 
such attributes within an ABC ecosystem. .e result could be that people end up mo-
delling themselves «upon their own artefacts. (...) .e creator interprets himself through 
the created» (Ihde, 1983, p. 74). When thinking of this in the light of potential obli-
gatory use of ABC cards for a wide range of purposes in a wide range of contexts, the 
question rises whether individuals would start to de0ne themselves and human traits in 
and shows that attributes may be important when authenticating for an opinion gathering 
(polls).
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general within the limits of the types and values of attributes recognized within an ABC 
ecosystem. Even if a wide range of attribute types and values is recognized, the ABC 
technology still dictates a black-and-white decision; the individual has or does not have 
a particular attribute, and on this base further decisions are made.
3.2. Function Creep
Technology can be developed for a particular use or purpose. However, oftentimes 
the technology allows for deployment for other purposes. .ere is no reason to exclude 
the applicability of this phenomenon to technology that is initially developed for pri-
vacy safeguarding purposes, such as ABC. Technology generally promotes or provokes 
a speci0c kind of use (Verbeek, 2005, p. 115), which can stray from the ideas behind 
the technology.
ABC cards are a technologically dictated reliable source of information and are pro-
moted as ‘privacy-friendly’ (Camenisch et al., 2010, 2011). An ABC card is much less 
intrusive than requesting an ID document, e.g. a passport. Businesses and government 
institutions will –most likely and to a certain extent– encourage its wide range of use, 
because it is a reliable source of authentic information that they want or need. .ese 
entities will be inclined to use ABC to lessen the chance getting accused of privacy-
infringements as they use a ‘privacy-friendly’ technology. As a consequence, more servi-
ces may ask for an ABC card and attributes. Once there is a nationwide infrastructure 
supporting ABC6, and once a large fraction of citizens owns an ABC-like card that is 
accepted by the majority of businesses and government institutions, the use of this 
card may become mandatory. Additionally, the cost for asking more information than 
is strictly necessary is essentially zero. .is could lead to the regulation of instances in 
which a service provider must or may ask for ABC. An individual could then be forced 
into a position in which she has to identify or authenticate herself in a context in which 
she previously did not have to do so. ABC can thus have the reverse e/ect with regard 
to the initial design idea. .is could increase the risk of being pro0led; service providers 
may allow or reject access to certain services based on a small set of attributes. .is 
might lead to discrimination in a new ‘jacket’; attribute-based discrimination.
3.3. Authentication Obstructs Obfuscation
Currently there are situations in which an individual does not have to prove her 
identity in order to get access to a service. For instance, when buying a book online, pa-
ying and providing a valid shipping address will generally lead to a successful transaction. 
6 E.g. Spirakis & Stamatiou (2013) suggest that the ABC technology will ultimately replace tra-
ditional PKI in the context of citizen identity.
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However, users are typically required to create an account to 0nish the transaction. Ex-
cept for relevant details (like shipping address), people can and do provide fake informa-
tion for irrelevant account data. Another example is the situation in which an individual 
wants to get access to a ‘personalized’ discount card of a grocery shop. Signing up for 
such a service with an obfuscated identity generally does not hinder the card issuance. 
In other words, in the current landscape the individual can obfuscate some information 
without disturbing the service delivery.
ABC cards might in3uence users in their obfuscation behaviour. Due to the priva-
cy-friendly image of ABC, the urge to obfuscate an identity can decline. However, by 
using an ABC system, individuals are no longer given a choice to autonomously decide 
if and what characteristics of their identity they will obfuscate. .e consequences of the 
implementation of ABC systems could be that services like Google and Facebook will 
have a foolproof way to enforce a real-name policy (Alpár & Jacobs, 2013). Similarly, 
age-restricted content is truly out of reach for minors. .is removes any discretionary 
decision space for parents (to allow their children access to age restricted content, such 
as computer games, where the age limit is often set by companies in countries that 
are di/erent from the age constraint typically enforced in the country of origin), or 
whistle blowers, researchers or journalists (that would like to use some services without 
revealing their full name). Over-implementation of an ABC system would diminish 
individuals their autonomy by depriving them of choices with regard to the manner in 
which they present themselves or use a pseudonym etc. in several kinds of interactions. 
Individuals will have to adhere to the norms of the service providers and are left little 
means to circumvent or negotiate these norms; their behaviour is regulated by techno-
logy (cf. Leenes, 2011).
4. ABC’S AND DATA PROTECTION BY DESIGN AND BY DEFAULT
.e following section will analyse the compatibility of an ABC system with the 
concept of Data Protection by Design and Data Protection by Default (DPbD) as pro-
posed in EU Data Protection Regulation. We will focus on the data protection regime 
as laid down in the European Union.7 At the time of writing this paper the Regulation8 
7 Data processing for purposes that fall outside the scope of the jurisdiction of the EU and data 
processing for criminal law enforcement purposes fall outside the scope of this paper. 
8 .e Draft version that is used to write this paper is: Report A7-0402/2013 on the proposal for 
a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General 
Data Protection Regulation) (COM(2012)0011 – C7-0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD)) Date: 
21.11.2013. We will refer to this version as: GDPR.
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is still in the making. However, despite the fact that the concept of DPbD is not (yet) 
substantive law, an analysis can be interesting for multiple reasons. Firstly, DPbD can 
be considered to be the legal obligation to implement privacy-enhancing technologies, 
such as ABC. Secondly, DPbD relates to the data protection standards as set in article 
5(1) sub a of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). .ese data protection 
standards date back to the early eighties when they 0rst appeared in international trea-
ties.9 By testing to these principles, the ABC technology is assessed against the core of 
the current data protection doctrine. .irdly, the ABC technology invites the increased 
usage of pseudonymous data. .e GDPR introduces an innovative ‘data protection 
light’ regime on pseudonymous data processing. Analysing the legal conditions DPbD 
could contribute to a better understanding of the privacy enhancement of this techno-
logy. Due to the word restrains we will focus on those aspects of DPbD that relate to 
the sociotechnical aspects.10
4.1. "e General Obligation of DPbD on the Data Processor
.e data protection framework regulates personal data processing. .e scope of 
the term data processing includes any operation that is performed upon personal data, 
whether or not by automatic means.11 .e term personal data refers to any informa-
tion relating to a directly or indirectly identi0ed or identi0able natural person.12 .e 
data protection framework, therefore, does not regulate the design phase of the systems 
that can process personal data. Knowing this, the EU commission called upon system 
designers to take responsibility -from a societal and ethical point of view- for the data 
protection aspects in their systems back in 2007.13 On top of this appeal and in hope 
that the data protection standards will permeate into the entire design chain, the EU 
legislator now introduces DPbD. .is new concept lays down a general obligation on 
the data controller to implement appropriate technical and organizational measures 
9 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data. Avail-
able on http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelines ontheprotectionofprivacyan-
dtransborder3owsofpersonaldata.htm Last retrieved on 10 March 2014. EC-Resolution on the 
protection of the rights of the individual in the face of developing technical progress in the 0eld 
of automatic data processing C60/48 13 March 1975; Convention for the Protection of Indi-
viduals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data No. 108; Directive 95/46/EC. 
10 Further research on the ABC and DPbD is suggested. 
11 GDPR article 2 sub b. .is includes collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or 
alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise 
making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction.
12 GDPR article 2 sub a.
13 Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) European Commission - MEMO/07/159   02/05/2007.
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within the entire life cycle of the technology to ensure data processing to meet the data 
protection standards.14 
As explained in the technical overview of ABC, credentials can contain identifying 
and non-identifying attributes. It follows that when directly identifying attributes are 
issued or revealed, the issuer or service provider is processing personal data and the Re-
gulation would apply. In case the presentation policy asks for a set of isolation-regarded 
non-directly identi0able attributes but the combination of the values or the combina-
tion with other non-ABC data is identifying, the Regulation also applies. In case the at-
tributes requested in the presentation policy are not directly identi0able and the context 
allows for certain ‘anonymity’, the data is anonymous and the Regulation does not apply. 
In the coming sections we will focus on the processing of personal data. In an ABC 
ecosystem the issuers and the service providers should be regarded as the data processors: 
they determine the purposes and the means of the data processing. .ese entities must 
ensure the data protection standards and should implement appropriate technical and 
organizational measures. .e substance of DPbD and the data processing standards will 
be assessed in the coming sections followed by the assessment of the extent to which 
ABC meet the DPbD obligation.
4.2. "e Data Protection Standards
DPbD should be taken into account at the moment of determining the purposes 
and the means of the data processing as well as at the time of the actual data proces-
sing itself. During the entire lifecycle of the data there should be a consistent focus on 
comprehensive procedural safeguards regarding the accuracy, con0dentiality, integrity, 
physical security and deletion of personal data. .e policy requirements of Data Pro-
tection by Default should safeguard that only those personal data are processed which 
are necessary for each speci0c purpose of the processing and are especially not collected, 
retained or disseminated beyond the minimum necessary for those purposes, both in 
terms of the amount of the data and the time of their storage. In particular, those me-
chanisms shall ensure that by default personal data are not made accessible to an inde0-
nite number of individuals and that data subjects are able to control the distribution of 
their personal data.15 In the latest version of the GDPR article 23(1) lists the conditions 
that should be taken into account while implementing the technical and organizational 
measures. .ese include: the state of the art current technical knowledge, international 
best practices and the risks represented by the data processing. .e data protection stan-
dards are formulated in article 5(1) sub a GDPR. .ey consist of the general instruction 
to only process data in a lawful, fair and transparent manner.
14 Recital 61 GDPR.
15 Article 23 GDPR.
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.e lawful processing standard is embodied by the criterion of legitimate purposes 
of article 5(1) sub b GDPR. .is criterion must be explained in terms of a substantive 
conception of legality.16 It does not only refer to the limitative enumeration of legal 
grounds on which data can be processed in accordance with article 6 of the GDPR, but 
also to the data controller’s duty to determine the purposes and to process personal data 
in accordance with the law, state-of-the-art techniques and cultural and societal norms.17 
.is criterion requires besides a legal assessment, a technology assessment, and hence has 
a potential propelling e/ect on the actual implementation of technological innovations. 
.e processing grounds of article 6 GDPR should be obtained prior to –or at the latest 
at the moment of– the processing of the personal data. At least one of the limitative 
processing grounds should apply; these grounds vary from consent to a balancing act 
between the legitimate interests of the data processor and the fundamental rights of the 
data subject.18 Consent should be a freely given speci0c and informed indication of the 
data subject’s wishes.19
One would expect an ABC process to be bases on the legitimate ground ‘consent’ 
because the user can agree or disagree with the presentation policy.20 However, as ex-
plained in section 2.1 the service provider is entitled to refuse the services in case the 
data subject does not agree to reveal all attributes that are requested in the presentation 
policy and the discretionary power of the user to lie about attribute values is limited 
(section 3.3). One could therefore question whether the ABC systems can process data 
on basis of consent in all instances; when the alternative is «no service» the freeness of 
the indication of the data subject’s wishes is doubtful. 
.e purpose limitation principle sets a precondition and demands personal data to 
be collected for speci0ed, explicit and legitimate purposes (purpose speci0cation) and 
not to be further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes (use limitation).21 
16 .is broader conception connects the processing grounds to the aspect of foreseeability of ar-
ticle 8(2) European Convention on Human Rights; in the case of interference with the right 
protected under article 8 there have to be clear, detailed rules specifying the conditions subject 
to which interferences are legitimate.
17 Article 29 Working Party Purpose Limitation 2013 WP 203. 
18 Article 6 a-f GDPR.
19 Recital 25 GDPR.
20 Article 6 sub a GDPR.
21 Use limitation prohibits the further processing of data in case the processing purposes are in-
compatible with the purposes at the time of the data collection .e article 29 Working Party 
proposed a test in which the relationship of the purposes, the reasonable expectations of the 
data subject, the nature of the data, impact of the data processing and the safeguards must be 
weighted in order to determine the compatibility. Article 29 Working Party Purpose Limitation 
2013 WP 203, p. 21 and 40.
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.is principle is of central importance to the whole data protection framework because 
it ful0ls a conditional function for the interpretation of the other fair processing princi-
ples, such as adequacy, relevance, proportionality, accuracy, completeness and duration 
of retention. Like the processing grounds, the purposes need to be speci0ed prior to, 
and in any event, not later than, the time when the collection of personal data occurs.
.e purpose of the use of ABC cards within a particular ecosystem is to a large ex-
tent determined by the scheme manager who determines what attribute types are recog-
nized. .e issuer decides about the variations in value. .ese variations determine the 
possibility for further use too. Take for example the values in the ‘gender’ attribute from 
the previous section. .e knowledge of gender X can be valuable for further processing 
for marketing or medical research purposes. .e policy aspects in3uence the further use 
and purposes. Personal data can only be processed if, and as long as, the purposes can-
not be ful0lled by lesser means, such as processing information that does not (directly) 
involve personal data: pseudonymous data or anonymous data. DPbD also sees on the 
storage minimization principle: «[P]ersonal data must be kept in a form which permits 
direct or indirect identi0cation of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the 
purposes for which the personal data are processed.»22
.e ABC technology hardcodes the data minimization principle. Once the scheme 
manager determined what is proportionate and necessary (within the limits of the Re-
gulation) and approves the presentation policies, the data processed for one purpose is 
minimized to the authorized attribute types coded in the presentation policy. However, 
as mentioned in the previous section on the socio-technical aspects, function creep is 
a potentially serious issue for ABC. Since ABC are generally perceived as a privacy-
enhancing technology and the system provides strong authentication and a ‘good image’, 
societal over-use could be a potential threat to the data processing minimization prin-
ciple. Besides this, the selective disclosure protocol of ABC empowers the data subject 
to control the 0rst release of the personal data, however, after that 0rst release the user 
is just as dependent on the service provider with regard to further use of the data as the 
subject is in current data processing. Further distribution of the data is not technically 
regulated by ABC systems and must be regulated by additional policies.
4.3. Pseudonymous Data and Profiling
.e GDPR proposes a special ‘light’ regime on the processing of pseudonymous 
data.23 Pseudonymous data should be distinguished from anonymous data, which is 
information that does not relate to an identi0ed or identi0able natural person. .e 
22 Article 5(1) sub e GDPR.
23 See Diaz et al. (2008) for an assessment on eID systems and the current legal framework on 
pseudonymous data.
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principles of data protection do not apply to anonymous data. Article 4(2) sub a GDPR 
de0nes pseudonymous data as personal data that cannot be attributed to a speci0c data 
subject without the use of additional information, as long as such additional information 
is kept separately and subject to technical and organizational measures to ensure non-
attribution. .is light regime particularly a/ects the legal regime on pro0ling: forms 
of automated processing of personal data intended to evaluate certain personal aspects 
relating to a natural person or to analyse or predict in particular that natural person’s 
performance at work, economic situation, location, health, personal preferences, relia-
bility or behaviour.24 Pro0ling based solely on the processing of pseudonymous data is 
not presumed to be signi0cantly a/ecting the interests, rights or freedoms of the data 
subject.25 However, when pro0ling –whether based on a single source of pseudonymous 
data or on the aggregation of pseudonymous data from di/erent sources– permits the 
controller to attribute pseudonymous data to a speci0c data subject, the processed data 
is no longer considered to be pseudonymous.26 
.e use of ABC could have propelling e/ect on pro0ling. As described in section 
3.2, 3.3. and 4.2 ABC can have a stimulating e/ect in terms of the quality of data that 
is revealed (paragraph 3.2 and 3.3) and the quantity of the data processing (3.2 and 
4.2). Pseudonymous data is often used for big data and predictive analytics for pro0ling 
and targeting purposes. Pro0ling on the basis of this type of data is not presumed to be 
signi0cantly a/ecting the interests, rights or freedoms of the data subject. However, one 
could question whether pro0ling with pseudonymous, but veri0ed authentic attributes, 
will -in the long run- not a/ect the interests, rights or freedoms of the data subject. With 
an ABC system the data becomes more valuable and the technology does not regulate 
the combination or further use of attributes; neither do the policies. .e proportionality 
assessment for the other purposes or further use for which the data might be collected 
via the ABC card, does not lay in the hands of the scheme manager because this entity 
only assesses the proportionality with regard to the authentication problem. 
24 Article 20 GDPR.
25 Recital 58 a GDPR.
26 Recital 23 GDPR states: .e principles of data protection should apply to any information con-
cerning an identi0ed or identi0able natural person. To determine whether a person is identi0able, 
account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used either by the controller or by 
any other person to identify or single out the individual directly or indirectly. To ascertain whether 
means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the individual, account should be taken of all 
objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identi0cation, taking 
into consideration both available technology at the time of the processing and technological devel-
opment. Art 10 lid 1. If the data processed by a controller do not permit the controller or proces-
sor to directly or indirectly identify a natural person, or consist only of pseudonymous data, the 
controller shall not process or acquire additional information in order to identify the data subject 
for the sole purpose of complying with any provision of this Regulation.
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5. REMAINING ISSUES
When it comes to implications of ABC the sections above are far from comprehen-
sive. In this section we intend to collect further problems that can arise while designing, 
deploying and operating an ABC system. .e technical countermeasures to these po-
tential issues are out of scope in this work because of space limitations and the socio-
technical and legal focus of the current research.
A serious security and privacy threat is formed by the user herself. In general, a user 
is the weakest link of systems security. ABC give the user control and with that more 
responsibility. For instance, by choosing an easy-to-guess PIN that authorises transac-
tions with service providers, a user risks the protection of her card. Another danger is 
social engineering that may enable malicious parties to capture the PIN or even the 
ABC card itself.
In order to have e/ective control, users should be empowered to check their attri-
bute values. A user-friendly way to do that is by means of a computer or smart phone. 
.is function should be safeguarded by a PIN or biometrics. In spite of the protection a 
computer or a smart phone is highly untrusted and identity theft via the ABC user panel 
is not unthinkable. Depending on the ecosystem this attack can become a ‘one-stop-
shop’ for cybercriminals. Moreover, because an ABC card stores a valuable collection 
of authentic personal data, the business incentive to develop malware (e.g. keylogger, 
trojan) to acquire these attributes is even bigger.
Malicious activities can also occur on an infrastructural level. Even though an attri-
bute may be anonymous, the ‘leaking’ of information from another level in the infras-
tructure, such as an IP address, could make the attribute pseudonymous or even fully 
identifying; consider for example, the nationality attribute with value ‘Australian’ in 
combination with IP address 82.165.102.217. 27 
From an organizational point of view the trustworthiness of the scheme manager 
is hard to determine. .e anonymous aspects of ABC make it even harder to audit the 
transactions and schemes. Although several revocation techniques have been suggested 
(Lapon et al., 2011, Hajny & Malina, 2013), the revocation of attributes is still di4cult 
because of the intractability of certain ABC transactions coupled with e4cient imple-
mentation and proper security (Alpár et al., 2013).
But the utmost di4culty for ABC has to be the mismatch between the idealism 
behind the technology and the current data-driven society. Personal data is considered 
the ‘new currency’ and without an ethical change the data processing practices will most 
likely not change. Connected to this issue is the nature of humans: people want to share 
27 .e IP address of the Embassy of Ecuador in London.
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data. .ere are yet to 0nd su4ciently appealing business cases for ABC that compete 
with the current data processing practices.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Like the legislators in Collingridge’s dilemma, we too «face a double-blind prob- lem: 
the e/ects of the new technology cannot be easily predicted until the technology is extensi-
vely deployed. Yet once deployed they become entrenched and are then di4cult to change.» 
[Collingridge, 1980]. Our attempt was to indicate a set of issues that are likely to arise and 
–at least– should be given thought before implementation of an ABC ecosystem in society. 
ABC should be regarded as a socio-technical system that requires co-existence of human 
and machine. .e e/ects of hard attributes on self-interpretation, the view of others and re-
3exive self-interpretation should be taken into consideration when assessing this technology. 
Attribute-based credentials limit the information overspill. But, as described in this paper, 
this technology does not limit data processing. Due to its privacy-friendly image and veri0ed 
high quality of data, prompt broad deployment of ABC seems tempting.
However, one could conclude that ABC might have a reverse e/ect with re- gard to 
the initial design idea because broad deployment in various contexts may result in stricter 
authentication than the current practice. .e use of ABC cards hinders an individual’s 
strategy in identity obfuscation and the use of fuzzed attributes. ABC diminish the pos-
sibility to lie and make informal social agreements. .e initial privacy-friendly intent 
in3uenced the technical design, but the technical design now in3uences the ‘further’ 
processing purposes. Because of the authenticity of the data and the data protection 
‘light’ regime on pseudonymous data, there is a high probability that information from 
the ABC will be further used for pro0ling purposes. In the long run this can a/ect the 
rights and freedoms of the data subject. Despite the stimulus data processing for further 
use might receive from ABC, the technical and policy scheme of ABC only regulates 
the 0rst use and the proportionality for this initial purpose. .erefore, ABC can be 
considered ‘data protection by design’ but they should not by default be considered data 
protection by default because many aspects are either not covered by the technology or 
depend on the grace of the scheme manager.
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